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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-97
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NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., et al., PETITION-
ERS v. COUNTY OF KENT, MICHIGAN, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the sixth circuit
[January 24, 1994]

  Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Seven commercial airlines, petitioners in this case,
assert that certain airport user fees charged to them are
unreasonable and discriminatory, in violation of the
federal Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA), 49 U. S. C. App.
1513, and the Commerce Clause.  Because the record,
as it now stands, does not warrant a judicial determina-
tion that the fees in question are unreasonable or
unlawfully discriminatory, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
                            I
                            A
  The user fees contested in this case are charged by
the Kent County International Airport in Grand Rapids,
Michigan.  The Airport is owned by respondent Kent
County and operated by respondents Kent County Board
of Aeronautics and Kent County Department of Aeronau-
tics (collectively, the Airport).  Petitioners are seven
commercial airlines serving the Airport (the Airlines).
  The Airport collects rent and fees from three groups
of users:  (1) commercial airlines, including petitioners;
(2) -general aviation,- i.e., corporate and privately owned
aircraft not used for commercial, passenger, cargo, or
military service; and (3) nonaeronautical concessionaires,
including car rental agencies, the parking lot, restau-
rants, gift shops, -rent-a-cart- facilities, and other small
vendors.  Since 1968, the Airport has allocated its costs
and set charges to aircraft operators pursuant to a -cost
of service- accounting system known as the -Buckley
methodology.-  This system is designed to charge the
Airlines only for the cost of providing the particular
facilities and services they use.
  Under its accounting system, the Airport first deter-
mines the costs of operating the airfield and the passen-
ger terminal, and allocates these costs among the users
of the facilities.  Costs associated with airfield opera-
tions (e.g., maintaining the runways and navigational
facilities) are allocated to the Airlines and general
aviation in proportion to their use of the airfield.  No
portion of these costs is allocated to the concessions.
Costs associated with maintaining the airport terminal
are allocated among the terminal tenants-the Airlines
and the concessions-in proportion to each tenant's
square footage.
  The Airport then establishes fees and rates for each
user group.  It charges the Airlines 100% of the costs
allocated to them, in the form of aircraft landing and
parking fees (for use of the airfield), and rent (for the
terminal space the Airlines occupy).  General aviation,
however, is charged at a lower rate.  The Airport
recovers from that user group a per gallon fuel flowage
fee for local aircraft and a landing fee for aircraft based
elsewhere.  These fees account for only 20% of the
airfield costs allocated to general aviation.
  In relation to costs, the Airport thus -undercharges-
general aviation.  At the same time, measured by
allocated costs, the Airport vastly -overcharges- the
concessions.  The Airlines pay a cost-based per square
foot rate for their terminal space.  The concessions,
however, pay market rates for their space.  Market
rates substantially exceed the concessions' allocated costs
and yield a sizable surplus.  The surplus offsets the
general aviation shortfall of approximately $525,000 per
year, and has swelled the Airport's reserve fund by more
than $1 million per year.
                            B
  Using the -Buckley methodology- just described, the
Airlines and the Airport periodically negotiated and
agreed upon fees to be charged through December 31,
1986.  Following a new rate study made in 1986, the
Airport proposed increased fees beginning January 1,
1987.  App. 193 (Plaintiffs' Exh. 6).  The Airlines
objected to the higher fees and failed to reach an
agreement with the Airport.  Ultimately, the County
Board of Aeronautics adopted an ordinance unilaterally
increasing the fees.  On the effective date of the
ordinance, April 1, 1988, the Airlines sued the Airport,
primarily challenging post-December 31, 1986 rates.
The Airlines attacked (1) the Airport's failure to allocate
to the concessions a portion of the airfield costs, (2) the
surplus generated by the Airport's fee structure, and (3)
the Airport's failure to charge general aviation 100% of
its allocated airfield costs.  These features, the Airlines
alleged, made the fees imposed on them unreasonable
and thus unlawful under the AHTA, 49 U. S. C. App.
1513, and the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of
1982 (AAIA), 49 U. S. C. App. 2210.  The Airlines also
asserted that the Airport's treatment of general aviation
discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of
primarily local traffic, in violation of the Commerce
Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3.
  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
In the first of three opinions, the District Court denied
the motions, holding that the Airport's cost methodology
is not per se unreasonable.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 57.
In its second opinion, the District Court held that the
Airlines have an implied right of action to challenge the
fees under the AHTA but not under the AAIA, and that
the Airlines have no cause of action under the Com-
merce Clause.  Id., at 42-46.  Following a bench trial,
the District Court issued its third and final opinion,
concluding that the challenged fees are not unreasonable
under the AHTA.  738 F. Supp. 1112 (WD Mich. 1990).
  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the District Court's judgment in principal part.  955 F.
2d 1054 (1992).  In accord with the District Court, the
Court of Appeals held that the AHTA impliedly confers
a private right of action on the Airlines, but the AAIA
does not.  Id., at 1058.  On the merits, the Court of
Appeals (1) upheld as reasonable under the AHTA the
bulk of the charges that the Airport imposes on the
Airlines, and (2) rejected the Airlines' dormant Com-
merce Clause claim on the ground that the AHTA
regulates the area.  Id., at 1060-1064.
  On one matter, however, the Court of Appeals re-
versed the District Court's judgment and remanded the
case.  The District Court had upheld as reasonable
under the AHTA the Airport's decision to allocate to the
Airlines 100% of the costs of providing -crash, fire, and
rescue- (CFR) services.  738 F. Supp., at 1119.  Empha-
sizing that the CFR facilities service all aircraft, not just
the Airlines, the Court of Appeals held that the Airport
must allocate CFR costs between the Airlines and
general aviation.  955 F. 2d, at 1062-1063, 1064.
  Petitioning for this Court's review, the Airlines
challenged the Court of Appeals' adverse rulings on the
AHTA and Commerce Clause issues.  The Airport did
not cross-petition for review of the Sixth Circuit's
judgment to the extent that it favored the Airlines;
specifically, the Airport did not petition for review of the
remand to the District Court for allocation of the costs
of CFR services between the Airlines and general
aviation.  We granted certiorari, 508 U. S. ___ (1993), to
resolve a conflict between the decision under review and
a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, Indianapolis Airport Authority v. American
Airlines, Inc., 733 F. 2d 1262 (1984), which declared key
parts of a similar fee structure unreasonable under the
AHTA.
                           II
                            A
  In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707 (1972), this Court
held that the Commerce Clause does not prohibit States
or municipalities from charging commercial airlines a
-head tax- on passengers boarding flights at airports
within the jurisdiction, to defray the costs of airport
construction and maintenance.  We stated in Evansville:
-At least so long as the toll is based on some fair
approximation of use or privilege for use, . . . and is
neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor
excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit
conferred, it will pass constitutional muster, even though
some other formula might reflect more exactly the
relative use of the state facilities by individual users.-
Id., at 716-717.
  Concerned that our decision in Evansville might
prompt a proliferation of local taxes burdensome to
interstate air transportation, Congress enacted the
AHTA.  See Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation
of Haw., 464 U. S. 7, 9-10 (1983) (summarizing history
of AHTA's enactment); S. Rep. No. 93-12, p. 4 (1973)
(Congress intended AHTA to -ensure . . . that local
`head' taxes will not be permitted to inhibit the flow of
interstate commerce-); id., at 17 (-The head tax . . . cuts
against the grain of the traditional American right to
travel among the States.-).
  The AHTA provides in pertinent part:
-(a)      Prohibition; exemption
      -No State (or political subdivision thereof . . .)
shall levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other
charge, directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in
air commerce or on the carriage of persons traveling
in air commerce or on the sale of air transportation
or on the gross receipts derived therefrom . . . .

-(b)      Permissible State taxes and fees
      -[N]othing in this section shall prohibit a State (or
political subdivision thereof . . .) from the levy or
collection of taxes other than those enumerated in
subsection (a) of this section, including property
taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales
or use taxes on the sale of goods or services; and
nothing in this section shall prohibit a State (or
political subdivision thereof . . .) owning or operat-
ing an airport from levying or collecting reasonable
rental charges, landing fees, and other service
charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport
facilities.- 49 U. S. C. App. 1513.
Primarily, the Airlines urge that the Airport's fees
overcharge them in violation of the AHTA.  Before
reaching that issue, however, we face a threshold
question.  The United States as amicus curiae and, less
strenuously, the Airport, urge that the Airlines have no
right to enforce the AHTA through a private action
commenced in a federal court of first instance.  Instead,
they maintain, complaints under the AHTA must be
pursued initially in administrative proceedings before the
Secretary of Transportation, subject to judicial review in
the courts of appeals.
  The threshold question is substantial: If Congress
intended no right of immediate access to a federal court
under the AHTA, then the Airlines' AHTA claim should
have been dismissed, not adjudicated on the merits as
it was, indeed in part favorably to the Airlines.  Howev-
er, the Airport filed no cross-petition for certiorari
seeking to upset the judgment to the extent that it
rejected the Airport's CFR cost allocation (100% to the
Airlines) as inconsonant with the AHTA.  For that
reason, we decline to resolve the private right of action
question in this case.
  A prevailing party need not cross-petition to defend a
judgment on any ground properly raised below, so long
as that party seeks to preserve, and not to change, the
judgment.  See, e.g., Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U. S. 27,
29-30 (1984).  A cross-petition is required, however,
when the respondent seeks to alter the judgment below.
See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U. S. 111, 119, n. 14 (1985); United States v. New York
Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 166, n. 8 (1977); Federal
Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S.
548, 560, n. 11 (1976); United States v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 420 U. S. 223, 226-227, n. 2 (1975).
Alteration would be in order if the private right of
action question were resolved in favor of the Airport.
For then, the entire judgment would be undone, includ-
ing the portion remanding for reallocation of CFR costs
between the Airlines and general aviation.  The Airport's
failure to file a cross-petition on the CFR issue-the
issue on which it was a judgment loser-thus leads us
to resist the plea to declare the AHTA claim unfit for
district court adjudication.
  The question whether a federal statute creates a claim
for relief is not jurisdictional.  See Air Courier Confer-
ence v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U. S. 517,
523, n. 3 (1991); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 476,
n. 5 (1979); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429
U. S. 274, 278-279 (1977); Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678,
682 (1946).  Accordingly, we shall assume, solely for pur-
poses of this case, that the alleged AHTA private right
of action exists.
                            B
  The AHTA prohibits States and their subdivisions
from levying a -fee- or -other charge- -directly or
indirectly- on -persons traveling in air commerce or on
the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce.-  49
U. S. C. 1513(a).  Landing fees, terminal charges, and
other airport user fees of the sort here challenged fit
1513(a)'s description.  As we confirmed in an opinion
invalidating a State tax on airlines' gross receipts,
1513(a)'s compass is not limited to direct -head- taxes.
Aloha Airlines, 464 U. S., at 12-13.
  But 1513(a) does not stand alone.  That subsection's
prohibition is immediately modified by 1513(b)'s per-
mission.  See Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of
Revenue, 477 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1986) (Burger, C. J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment) (1513(b)'s
saving clause was enacted in response to the States'
concern that 1513(a)'s -sweeping provision would pro-
hibit even unobjectionable taxes such as landing fees
. . .-).  Sections 1513(a) and (b) together instruct that
airport user fees are permissible only if, and to the
extent that, they fall within 1513(b)'s saving clause,
which removes from 1513(a)'s ban  -reasonable rental
charges, landing fees, and other service charges from
aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities.-
  While 1513(b) allows only -reasonable rental charges,
landing fees, and other service charges,- the AHTA does
not set standards for assessing reasonableness.  Courts,
we recognize, are scarcely equipped to oversee, without
the initial superintendence of a regulatory agency, rate
structures and practices.  See Colorado Interstate Co. v.
FPC, 324 U. S. 581, 589 (1945) (-Rate-making is essen-
tially a legislative function.-); cf. Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U. S. 570, 574 (1952) (-in cases
raising issues of fact not within the conventional experi-
ence of judges or cases requiring the exercise of admin-
istrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for
regulating the subject matter should not be passed
over-).  The Secretary of Transportation is charged
with administering the federal aviation laws, including
the AHTA.  His Department is equipped, as courts
are not, to survey the field nationwide, and to regulate
based on a full view of the relevant facts and circum-
stances.  If we had the benefit of the Secretary's rea-
soned decision concerning the AHTA's permission for the
charges in question, we would accord that decision
substantial deference.  See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837,
842-845 (1984).  Lacking guidance from the Secretary,
however, and compelled to give effect to the statute's
use of -reasonable,- we must look elsewhere.
  The parties point to the standards this Court employs
to measure the reasonableness of fees under the Com-
merce Clause, as stated in the Evansville case, see
supra, at 5-6; they invite our use of the Evansville
standards as baselines for determining the reasonable-
ness of fees under the AHTA.  We accept the parties'
suggestions.  Although Congress enacted the AHTA
because it found unsatisfactory the end result of our
Commerce Clause analysis in Evansville-the validation
of -head- taxes-Congress specifically permitted, through
1513(b)'s saving clause, -reasonable rental charges,
landing fees, and other services charges.-  The formu-
lation in Evansville has been used to determine -reason-
ableness- in related contexts.  See, e.g., American
Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266,
289-290 (1987) (applying Evansville test to assess valid-
ity under Commerce Clause of state taxes applied to
interstate motor carrier); Massachusetts v. United States,
435 U. S. 444, 466-467 (1978) (applying Evansville test
to determine constitutionality of tax under intergovern-
mental immunity doctrine).  It will suffice for the pur-
pose at hand.
  To recapitulate, a levy is reasonable under Evansville
if it (1) is based on some fair approximation of use of
the facilities, (2) is not excessive in relation to the
benefits conferred, and (3) does not discriminate against
interstate commerce.  405 U. S., at 716-717.  The Air-
lines contend that the Airport's fee structure fails the
Evansville test on three main counts.  We consider each
contention in turn.
                            1
  As noted above, the Airport allocates its air operations
costs between the Airlines and general aviation; the
concessions in fact supply the lion's share of the
Airport's revenues, see supra, at 3, but are allocated
none of these costs.  The Airlines contend that the
concessions benefit substantially, albeit indirectly, from
air operations, because those operations generate the
concessions' customer flow.  Therefore, the Airlines urge,
the Airport's failure to allocate to the concessions any of
the airfield-associated costs violates Evansville's require-
ment that user fees be -based on some fair approxima-
tion of use or privilege for use.-  405 U. S., at 716-717.
The cost reallocation sought by the Airlines would not
change the market-based rent paid by the concessions,
see supra, at 3, but it would lower the charges imposed
on the Airlines.
  We see no obvious conflict with Evansville in the
Airport's allocation of the costs of air operations to the
Airlines and general aviation, but not to the conces-
sions.  Only the Airlines and general aviation actually
use the runways and navigational facilities of the Air-
port; the concessions use only the terminal facilities.
The Airport's decision to allocate costs according to a
formula that accounts for this distinction appears to
-reflect a fair, if imperfect, approximation of the use of
facilities for whose benefit they are imposed.-  405
U. S., at 716-717.
  The District Court found that (with one minor excep-
tion) the Airport charged the Airlines -the break-even
costs for the areas they use.-  738 F. Supp., at 1119.
In this light, we cannot conclude that the Airlines were
charged fees -excessive in comparison with the govern-
mental benefit conferred.-  Evansville, supra, at 717.
See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25
(-As long as an airport's charges to air carriers do not
result in revenues that exceed by more than a reason-
able margin the costs of servicing those carriers, the
Secretary would normally sustain those charges as
reasonable under federal law.-) (citing Federal Aviation
Administration, Airport Compliance Requirements, Order
No. 5190.6A 4-13, 4-14, pp. 20-22 (Oct. 2, 1989), and
14 CFR 399.110(f) (1993)).

                            2
  The Airlines also contend that the Airport's fee meth-
odology is unlawful because, by imposing on the Airlines
virtually all of the air-operations costs, and exacting
fees from the concessions far in excess of their allocated
costs, the methodology generates huge surpluses.  The
AHTA, however, does not authorize judicial inquiry
focused on the amount of the Airport's surplus.  The
statute requires only that an airport's fees not -be
excessive in relation to costs incurred by the taxing
authorities- for benefits conferred on the user.  Evans-
ville, supra, at 719.  As we have explained, the Airlines
are charged only for the costs of benefits they receive.
The Airport's surplus is generated from fees charged to
concessions, and the amounts of those fees are not at
issue.  As the Court of Appeals pointed out, 1513(b)
applies only to fees charged to -aircraft operators.-  955
F. 2d, at 1060.
  The Airlines urge us to consider the effect of the
concession revenues when deciding whether the fees
charged the Airlines are reasonable, pointing to the
Seventh Circuit's analysis in Indianapolis Airport v.
American Airlines, Inc., 733 F. 2d, at 1268 (invalidating
the Indianapolis Airport's fee structure on the ground,
inter alia, that the Airport's generation of a surplus
from the concession fees indirectly raises the costs of air
travel).  The Seventh Circuit, however, overlooked a key
factor.  It reasoned explicitly from the incorrect premise
that -[n]o agency has regulatory authority over the rate
practices of the Indianapolis Airport Authority.-  Ibid.
The Seventh Circuit panel believed that -the duty of
regulation [fell] to the courts in the enforcement of the
state and federal statutes forbidding unreasonable
rates.-  Ibid.  That court thought it necessary to -imag-
ine [itself] in the role of a regulatory agency.-  Ibid.  In
contrast, our opinion in this case emphasizes that the
Department of Transportation has regulatory authority
to enforce the federal aviation laws, including the AHTA
and the AAIA, see supra, at 10, and n. 11, so there is
no cause for courts to offer a substitute for -convention-
al public utility regulation,- 733 F. 2d, at 1268.
  We resist inferring a limit on airport surpluses from
the AHTA for a further reason.  That measure does not
mention surplus accumulation, but another statute, the
AAIA, directly addresses the use of airport revenues.
The AAIA requires that -all revenues generated by the
airport . . . be expended for the capital or operating
costs of the airport . . . .-  49 U. S. C. App.
2210(a)(12) (emphasis supplied).  The Airlines do not
suggest that the Airport is using its surplus for any
purpose other than Airport-related expenses, nor did
they seek review of the lower courts' holding that they
had no right of action under the AAIA.  955 F. 2d, at
1058-1059.  For these reasons, even if the AAIA is read
to impose a limit on the accumulation of surplus reve-
nues, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
26-27, the question whether the Airport's surpluses are
excessive is not properly before us.

                            3
  Finally, the Airlines contend that the Airport's fees
discriminate against them in favor of general aviation,
in violation of Evansville's instruction that airport tolls
be nondiscriminatory regarding interstate commerce and
travel.  As earlier recounted, see supra, at 2-3, the
Airlines pay 100% of their allocated costs while general
aviation users are assessed fees covering only 20% of
their allocated costs.
  We need not consider whether the Airlines would have
a compelling point had they established that general
aviation is properly categorized as intrastate commerce.
Cf., e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504
U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 4-13) (invalidating
state fee on hazardous wastes generated outside, but
disposed of inside, the State, because it discriminated
against interstate commerce); American Trucking Assns.,
Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S., at 268-269 (invalidating
state highway use taxes because they discriminated
against interstate motor carriers).  The record in this
case, it suffices to say, does not support the Airlines'
argument.  We cannot assume, in the total absence of
proof, that the large and diverse general aviation popu-
lation served by the Airport travels typically intrastate
and seldom ventures beyond Michigan's borders.
                           III
  The Airlines assert that, even if the Airport's user fees
are not unreasonable under the AHTA, they violate the
-dormant- Commerce Clause.  Even if we considered the
AHTA's express permission for States' imposition of
-reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other
service charges from aircraft operators for the use of
airport facilities,- 49 U. S. C. App. 1513(b), insuffi-
ciently clear to rule out judicial dormant Commerce
Clause analysis, petitioners' argument would fail.  We
have already found the challenged fees reasonable under
the AHTA through the lens of Evansville-that is, under
a reasonableness standard taken directly from our dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
                         *  *  *
  For the reasons stated, and without prejudging the
outcome of any eventual proceeding before or regulation
by the Secretary of Transportation, we affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals.
                                      It is so ordered.

  Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.